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Productive Employment and the Evolution 
of Training Contracts in Italy  
 
 
1. Overview of the problem 
 
The new provisions relating to training contracts may be said to be among the most sig-
nificant features – but probably also the most neglected by legal scholars – of the recent 
reform of the Italian labour market (the Biagi Reform, Act no. 30, 14 February 2003)1
It may be argued, at least in terms of industrial relations, that it is this improper use of 
training contracts that has made it possible on a number of occasions to put off the re-
form of the Italian labour market, thus making younger workers, who tend to be less 
represented by the trade unions, carry a good deal of the burden of flexibility required 
by employers. It is therefore not surprising that the problem of youth employment has 
become a major concern in Italy, due to the high levels of unemployment, without par-
. 
The underlying rationale of this reform may be summarised, in this connection, as an 
attempt to put an end to the ambiguities and grave anomalies in the use and develop-
ment of “atypical” contracts. There has been an abnormal development, often in the 
grey area of the law, caused by the refusal to tackle the overall reform of the labour 
market, and as a result these atypical contracts have become a kind of safety valve for 
dealing with the persistent rigidities of standard employment contracts. In this perspec-
tive, it may be argued that training contracts have become just a form of temporary em-
ployment, a kind of fixed-term contract allowing for an exception to traditional labour 
law standards solely on the basis of age criteria. This form of employment is attractive 
to employers, not only because it is an additional instrument in relation to the limited 
range of options made available by the legislator for temporary work, but also because 
it is accompanied by generous incentives in the form of insurance contributions and tax 
relief, though it provides no guarantee at all of the effectiveness of training, that in 
many cases has been inadequate. 
                                            
1 On the reform of the labour market, reference can be made to the documentation and the bibliography 
on the Marco Biagi Centre for International and Comparative Studies website (www.adapt.it), index A-Z, 
under Riforma Biagi. 
allel in the rest of Europe, but also as a result of the lack of investment in training that 
has given rise to widespread precarious employment among young people2
Within a normative and conceptual paradigm reflecting a Ford-Taylorist model of work 
organisation and production, training contracts providing access to the labour market 
have long been used as an instrument enabling employers not only to select workers 
most suited to productive needs in organisational contexts that are largely static and not 
particularly innovative, but also to benefit from lower labour costs during training, as a 
result of lower pay scales for trainees, and due to the generous subsidies made avail-
able, often in exchange for minimal or non-existent training programmes, as in the case 
of many work training contracts.  
.  
Like other Mediterranean countries, Italy has tended to subordinate training objectives 
to aims such as cutting labour costs, reducing the rigidity of the labour market in terms 
of protection for salaried workers, providing income support for young unemployed 
people and building social consensus. However, this strategy has turned out to be 
counterproductive, not only because it has failed to reduce the high levels of unem-
ployment and precarious employment among young people. It also appears that the 
improper use of training contracts has had the effect of diminishing the overall quality 
of human capital in Italy to the point that there has been a sharp decline in interna-
tional competitiveness. 
It was therefore inevitable that as part of the overall reform of the labour market one of 
the main objectives was the adoption of a new system of training contracts in order to 
ensure their proper utilisation. 
In this scenario it is possible to see the clear distinction made by the Biagi reform be-
tween apprenticeships and access-to-work contracts, that have replaced employment 
training contracts. Whereas apprenticeship contracts are an effective training instrument 
for the market, in access-to-work contracts training is secondary to the primary goal, 
which is to promote access to (re)employment for particular categories. This explains 
why economic incentives are maintained only for apprenticeship contracts and only on 
condition that the worker is actually given training. For access-to-work contracts, nor-
mative provisions are made available for all categories of employees, whereas eco-
nomic incentives will no longer be granted for those in the 18-29 age group, who are 
considered to be less disadvantaged.  
By means of this reform it will be possible in the coming years to pursue a comprehen-
sive new strategy in the use of training contracts and financial incentives based on a 
real investment in human capital as a key factor in facing international competition3
 
. 
 
2. The functional overloading of training contracts and their improper use 
 
The difficulty of making a rigorous distinction between the training provisions in em-
ployment contracts and financial support for employers is not encountered only in the 
                                            
2 On this aspect, that is beyond the topic of this paper, see M. Tiraboschi, ‘Young People and Employ-
ment in Italy: the (Difficult) Transition from Education and Training to the Labour Market’, in The Interna-
tional Journal of Comparative labour Law and Industrial Relations, 2006, n. 1. 
3 For further details see M. Tiraboschi, ‘The Italian Labour Market after the Biagi Reform’, in The Interna-
tional Journal of Comparative labour Law and Industrial Relations, 2005, n. 2. 
 Italian system, though in Italy the improper and instrumental use of training contracts 
has reached a level of degeneration not found in other systems4
It is evident that apprenticeship contracts and employment training contracts have been 
improperly used, especially in recent decades, also because of a degree of overlapping 
in typological and normative terms, which tends to make them even more dysfunc-
tional. The training component has in many cases been neglected due to a kind of func-
tional overload, either for political reasons simply to provide funding for enterprises, 
thanks to the surreptitious reduction of labour costs made possible by generous grants, 
which the European Union has started to take action against
. 
5
It remains the case that – as in other southern European countries
, or in relation to access to 
the labour market for unemployed people and income support for the younger mem-
bers of the labour force. 
6
All this is by no means surprising but it should be seen in relation to a critical position – 
which has hardly been applied in practical terms – which for some time now has high-
lighted the dysfunctional aspects of training policies
 – alongside tradi-
tional training objectives, an increasingly important, indeed a predominant, role has 
been played in recent decades by other functions that are improper, such as cutting la-
bour costs, reducing certain (presumed or real) rigidities in the regulations that protect 
standard subordinate employment, providing income support for ever larger groups of 
young workers, attempting to achieve a social consensus, and so on. 
7. These policies, especially in Italy, 
are often confused with employment policies, and are assigned tasks and objectives 
that they cannot perform, such as the creation of new employment, the fight against 
unemployment and social exclusion, and so on. What clearly emerges from this is the 
ambiguous nature of so-called training contracts which are unable to provide genuine 
programmes with periods of alternation between work and training but which are actu-
ally used as a means to hire workers on lower rates than would otherwise be possible. 
Once it has been recognised that vocational training is not in itself capable of generat-
ing new employment, then it becomes possible to carry out a meaningful analysis of the 
role to be assigned to apprenticeships and other forms of training contract with an al-
ternation between work and training, without expecting contracts of this kind to be-
come a panacea for the complex problems of the labour market, a fact that was clear in 
the context of the reform of apprenticeship contracts in the Treu measures in 19978
In this connection the redesign of training contracts delineated in the Biagi reform must 
be seen in the light of the complex provisions included in Legislative Decree no. 
276/2003, including provisions on adaptability, limiting the improper use of labour 
flexibility and training policies, and provisions on employability, aimed at strengthening 
the position of the individual worker in relation to sudden and unexpected changes in 
the labour market. 
.  
                                            
4 For a comparative study see M. Biagi, M. Tiraboschi, ‘La rilevanza della formazione in apprendistato in 
Europa: problemi e prospettive’, in Diritto delle Relazioni Industriali, 1999, no. 1. p. 87. 
5 For an analysis of the problem see M. Tiraboschi, Incentivi alla occupazione, aiuti di Stato, diritto co-
munitario della concorrenza, Giappichelli, Turin, 2002, ch. III. 
6 See again M. Biagi, M. Tiraboschi, La rilevanza della formazione in apprendistato in Europa: etc., cit. 
7 See also the documentation and bibliography at www.adapt.it, index A-Z, under Formazione. 
8 See A. Vittore, F. Landi, ‘L’articolo 17 della Legge n. 196/1997: coordinate per la riforma del sistema 
della formazione professionale’, in M. Biagi (ed.), Mercati e rapporti di lavoro. Commentario alla legge 
24 giugno 1997, n. 196, Giuffrè, Milan, 1997, 237. 
This is the overall logic that explains the clear functional and normative separation of 
the two forms of contract. Whereas apprenticeships now become an institutional chan-
nel providing young people with access to the labour market, by means of an alterna-
tion between employment and training properly speaking, employment training con-
tracts are being phased out (albeit only in the private sector) and in their place the legis-
lator makes provision for a flexible new type of contract, known as the access-to-work 
contract (contratto di inserimento al lavoro), in which the training objective is seen in 
relation to the primary objective of employment policy, that is the entry or re-entry into 
the labour market of particular categories of individuals. This is why it is only for ap-
prenticeship contracts that the economic incentives currently made available are main-
tained. On the other hand, the new access-to-work contracts make use of normative in-
centives, operating on two distinct levels: the application of normative incentives is 
provided for all categories of worker, whereas economic incentives will not be granted 
to the groups of workers considered to be the least disadvantaged, that is to say young 
people between the ages of 18 and 299
 
. 
 
3. Types of apprenticeship after the Biagi reform 
 
Legislative Decree no. 276, 10 September 2003, reaffirms the right and duty to take part 
in education and training, including the training options providing for the alternation of 
training and employment adopted in the Moratti reform of the education system, and 
then identifies three distinct types of apprenticeship contract10
The employment provisions for these three types of apprenticeship contract are funda-
mentally similar, though the training schemes differ considerably for each of them, as a 
function of the result to be achieved. 
. In addition to the ap-
prenticeship contract relating to the right and duty to take part in an education and 
training programme, the reform makes provision also for vocational apprenticeships, for 
obtaining a qualification by means of on-the-job training and the acquisition of techni-
cal and vocational skills, expected to be the type of contract that is most commonly 
used, and finally an apprenticeship leading to a diploma or specialised training. 
In particular, the employment contract is required to be drawn up in writing and to 
contain a description of the work to be carried out, the training to be given, and the 
qualification to be gained at the end of the training period. In addition, it is forbidden to 
pay the apprentice by piecework, or to terminate the apprenticeship before it has run its 
full term in the absence of a just cause or justified reason. 
The vocational qualifications gained with all the new apprenticeship contracts give rise 
to an entitlement to credits for further education and vocational training11
In order to harmonise the various qualifications obtained the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Policy is to set up a register of vocational qualifications. This will be drawn up 
by a commission set up by the Ministry of Education, Higher Education and Research, 
. 
                                            
9 On this point, also on the difference between economic and normative incentives, see Tiraboschi, In-
centivi alla occupazione, aiuti di Stato, diritto comunitario della concorrenza, cit. 
10 See the documentation and bibliography at www.adapt.it, index A-Z, under Apprendistato. 
11 The procedures for the recognition of training credits are to be established pursuant to Article 51(2), 
Legislative Decree no. 276/2003, in compliance with the competences of the autonomous provinces and 
regions and with the provisions of the Unified Conference of State-Regions-Autonomous Local Authori-
ties in the Agreement of 18 February 2000 and the provisions of Legislative Decree no. 174/2001. 
 the employers’ associations and the most representative trade unions at national level, 
and representatives of the Conference of the State and the Regions. 
The national legislator, confirming earlier provisions, has laid down quantitative limits 
on the use of this type of contract. In particular the percentage of apprentices that may 
be hired in relation to specialised and qualified staff employed in the firm may not be 
greater than 100 except in the artisan sector (micro and small enterprises), that are regu-
lated by more favourable provisions as laid down in Article 4, Act no. 443/1985. More-
over, employers who have no specialised and qualified employees, or fewer than three, 
are not entitled to hire more than three apprentices. In all cases under the terms of cur-
rent provisions the employer has the right to terminate the employment relationship 
upon completion of the apprenticeship, pursuant to Article 2118 of the Civil Code. This 
latter provision takes on a particular significance in defining apprenticeship contracts. 
Although opinion is divided among legal scholars, the apprenticeship contract may be 
said to be a special kind of open-ended employment relationship, which is character-
ised by the fact that both the employer and the apprentice are entitled to terminate the 
relationship at the end of the period of training by giving notice to the other party (as 
laid down by Article 19, Act no. 25, 1955). 
Unlike the procedure for fixed-term contracts, which automatically expire at the end of 
the agreed period, apprenticeship contracts require notice to be served pursuant to Ar-
ticle 2118 of the Civil Code, a provision expressly entitled “Termination of open-ended 
contracts”. In the event that notice is not served, the employment relationship continues 
in the same way as a normal open-ended employment contract. 
On the basis of these particular provisions for the termination of the apprenticeship 
contract, it may be considered to be an open-ended contract (a tempo indeterminato), 
as it is not a fixed-term contract in the technical sense, but an employment contract 
with a maximum duration, linked to particular training objectives: once these objec-
tives have been fulfilled, and in the absence of notice of termination, it is automatically 
transformed into an open-ended employment relationship12
Especially after the Biagi reform, which aims to strengthen the training component and 
to provide an institutional channel for access by young people to the labour market, the 
apprenticeship contract should therefore be considered to be an open-ended employ-
ment contract characterised by a deadline by which the parties are free to terminate the 
contract, coinciding with the completion of the training period. 
. 
 
 
3.1. The first level: apprenticeship contracts for exercising the right and duty to 
take part in education and training 
 
After the age of 15, young people can be hired on apprenticeship contracts for exercis-
ing the right and duty to take part in education and training. This contracts lay the 
foundation for implementing the new right and responsibility to take part in education 
and training for 12 years, introduced alongside the abolition of obligatory schooling, in 
compliance with the constitutional principle of labour law, which, pursuant to provi-
sions currently in force on the employment of minors, could not be denied once a 
young person has reached the age of 15. With the entry into force of the Moratti reform 
                                            
12 In this connection see G. Suppiej, (heading) Apprendistato, in Enc. Giur, Giuffrè; Ferraro, Contratto di 
apprendistato. 
of education, apprenticeship contracts become the only form of employment permitted 
between the ages of 15 and 18. This form of apprenticeship, that may be used in any 
sector of the economy, is intended to lead to a vocational qualification and has a 
maximum duration of three years. Young people who will be able to take up this form 
of employment, in principle, are those from 15 to 18 years of age, but not necessarily, 
because also those over the age of 18 who have not completed a sufficient period of 
education or training may also be employed on contracts of this type. In addition, the 
duration of the contract will be determined on the basis of the vocational qualification 
to be obtained, the academic qualification, the vocational and training credits awarded, 
and the skills assessment carried out by the public employment services or accredited 
private bodies, by means of the recognition of training credits pursuant to Act no. 53, 
28 March 2003. 
The regulation of the training component of apprenticeship contracts for exercising the 
right and duty to take part in education and training is the responsibility of the regions 
and the autonomous provinces of Trento and Bolzano, in agreement with the Ministry 
of Labour and Social Policy and the Ministry of Education, Higher Education and Re-
search, on condition that they obtain the opinion of the employers’ associations and the 
most representative trade unions at national level. 
In order not to interfere with the competences of the regions in training matters, certain 
fundamental principles are laid down at national level. The definition of vocational 
qualifications is to be carried out pursuant to Act no. 53, 28 March 2003. Moreover, 
the total number of hours of training, both on-the-job and off-the-job, considered to be 
necessary to obtain a vocational qualification, will be established on the basis of mini-
mum vocational standards laid down pursuant to Act no. 53, 28 March 2003. Once 
again it is important to note that the decree does not lay down a fixed number of hours, 
as initially intended in the early drafts of the decree that specified 1200/1800 hours of 
training. 
The extreme flexibility in terms of the number of hours of training, and the means by 
which training may be carried out, may be explained by the fact that these matters are 
to be determined by collective labour agreements at national, territorial or company 
level by employers’ associations and the most representative trade unions, with the de-
termination, also by joint bodies (enti bilaterali), of the most suitable forms of company 
training, in compliance with the general standards laid down by the competent regions. 
To safeguard the effectiveness of training programmes, a tutor with the necessary train-
ing and professional skills is required within the company. 
From this overview of the regulation of first-level apprenticeship contracts, it may be 
seen that there is no risk of the nature of such contracts being radically transformed. 
Starting from the principle that the exercise of the right and duty to take part in educa-
tion and training is a matter of public policy, concerning the training of young people, 
an alternative system might have been adopted (not proposed by the present author), in 
which the education system rather than the enterprise would have had to meet the cost 
of providing training to enable these young people to enter the labour market. 
 
 
3.2. The second level: vocational apprenticeships 
 
Young people between the ages of 18 and 29 can be hired in all sectors of the econ-
omy on vocational apprenticeship contracts, in order to obtain a qualification by means 
 of on-the-job training and the acquisition of basic, transferable, and technical-
vocational skills. Moreover, 17-year-olds can also be hired on such contracts provided 
they have obtained a vocational qualification pursuant to Act no. 52, 28 March 2003. 
At least in terms of the definition of those eligible, the historic difference between the 
artisan sector and other sectors has therefore been eliminated. 
The duration of vocational apprenticeships is to be determined by collective agree-
ments concluded between the employers’ associations and the most representative 
trade unions at national or regional level, though in any case the duration must be at 
least two years and no more than six. Moreover, it is allowed to add time spent in an 
apprenticeship for the exercise of the right and duty to take part in education and train-
ing and a vocational apprenticeship periods, provided that the total duration is no more 
than six years. 
While safeguarding certain general principles, the regulation of the training component 
of vocational apprenticeships is the responsibility of the regions, in agreement with the 
employers’ associations and the most representative trade unions at regional level. 
However, these agreements have been only partially negotiated, and it is for this reason 
that vocational apprenticeships has been implemented only in a partial and uneven 
manner, even now, some three years after the entry into force of the Biagi Act13
Unlike the first type of apprenticeship, provision is made for a minimum number of 
hours, amounting to 120 per annum, for the acquisition of basic and technical-
vocational skills. In contrast with previous legislative provisions, such training may be 
carried out in the company and even in the form of distance learning. 
. 
This means the abrogation of the principle introduced by Act no. 196, 24 June 1997, by 
which the granting of contributions relief to the employer was dependent on the ap-
prentice taking part in training programmes outside the company. 
Collective agreements concluded at national, territorial or company level by employers’ 
associations and the most representative trade unions are to determine, also through 
joint bodies14
Also in this case a company tutor with suitable qualifications and skills is required, and 
records must be kept of the training provided in the employee’s training portfolio (li-
bretto formativo). 
, the means by which training will be provided, whether within the com-
pany or externally.  
 
 
3.3. The third level: higher apprenticeships 
 
Young people between the ages of 18 and 29 can be hired in all sectors of the econ-
omy on higher-level apprenticeship leading to the award of a high-school diploma, or 
university and advanced qualifications, as well as advanced technical specialisations 
pursuant to Article 69, Act no. 144, 17 May 1999. 
In this case the regulations laid down in the decree law are minimal, mainly making 
provision for apprenticeship contracts to be used for advanced vocational training, as in 
other countries. While no attempt is made to modify programmes that are already op-
erational (the decree law refers to “agreements in force”), the task of regulating and de-
ciding the duration of apprenticeships for the award of a diploma or for advanced train-
                                            
13 See the documentation and bibliography at www.adapt.it, index A-Z, under Apprendistato. 
14 See the documentation and bibliography at www.adapt.it, index A-Z, under Enti bilaterali. 
ing is assigned to the regions, in agreement with the regional employers’ associations 
and trade unions, universities and other training institutions. 
 
 
4. The demise of employment training contracts and the birth of access-to-work con-
tracts 
 
On the other hand major changes are planned for employment training contracts, 
which are to be abolished15
Under the terms of the new definition
. The legislator has taken account of the almost total lack of 
any training component in employment training contracts, and has reconsidered their 
function with a view to giving priority to access – and above all re-entry to the labour 
market – on the part of particular groups of workers. As a result, entry-level contracts 
(contratti di inserimento) in the public administration are being phased out. 
16, access-to-work contracts are intended to im-
plement an individual plan for the adaptation of the vocational skills of the worker to a 
specific workplace, in order to facilitate access or re-entry to the labour market on the 
part of the following categories: a) young people between the ages of 18 and 29; b) 
those in long-term unemployment between the ages of 29 and 32; c) workers over the 
age of 50 who are not currently employed; d) workers who intend to start work again 
after a break of at least two years; e) women of all ages who are resident in geographi-
cal areas where the rate of employment for women17
Access-to-work contracts can be issued by: a) public undertakings, enterprises or con-
sortia; b) groups of private enterprises; c) professional, social, cultural or sports associa-
tions; d) foundations; e) public or private research bodies; f) sectoral organisations or 
associations. 
 is at least 20 per cent less than the 
rate for men, or where the female unemployment rate is at least 10 per cent higher than 
the rate for men; f) individuals who pursuant to current provisions have a recognised 
physical disability, learning disability, or psychiatric disorder. 
Making use of a scheme adopted in the regulations for employment training contracts, 
it is provided that the use of this type of contract, made more attractive by a mixture of 
both normative and economic incentives, is conditional on the employer having con-
tinued to employ at least 60 per cent of the workers whose access-to-work contracts 
have run out over the previous 18 months. In calculating this figure, no account is 
taken of workers who have resigned, those who have been dismissed for good reason, 
and those who at the end of their access-to-work contracts have rejected an offer to 
continue in employment on an open-ended contract, those whose contracts were ter-
minated during or at the end of the probation period, and a maximum number of four 
contracts not converted into fixed-term employment contracts. This provision will take 
effect as from its entry into force, and therefore will not take into account the conver-
sion of the old employment training contracts expiring during the period of transition to 
the new regime. 
                                            
15 See the documentation and bibliography at www.adapt.it, index A-Z, under Contratto di formazione e 
lavoro. 
16 See the documentation and bibliography at www.adapt.it, index A-Z, under Contratto di inserimento. 
17 The employment rate referred to was calculated, pursuant to Article 54(1)(e), with a decree of the Min-
istry of Labour and Social Policy together with the Ministry of the Economy and Finance (Novembre 
2005 at www.adapt.it, index A-Z, under Contratto di inserimento). 
 4.1. Vocational access plans 
 
An essential component of access-to-work contracts is the vocational access plan. The 
hiring of workers on access-to-work contracts is conditional on the adoption, by the 
contracting parties, of an individual training plan aimed at guaranteeing the adaptation 
of the professional skills of the employee to the workplace. 
Collective agreements concluded at national level, or at territorial level by the employ-
ers’ associations and the comparatively most representative trade unions at national 
level, and company-level contracts concluded by the company trade union representa-
tives or the unitary trade unions, also through joint bodies, make provision for the regu-
lation of individual access-to-work contracts, with particular regard to the provision of 
training, also with the support of multisector training funds, for the purposes of improv-
ing vocational skills. 
 
 
4.2. The regulation of access-to-work contracts 
 
Access-to-work contracts are deemed to be equivalent to fixed-term employment con-
tracts, though they are characterised by the presence of an access plan supported by a 
mixture of economic and normative incentives. In the absence of different provisions in 
the collective agreements concluded at national or territorial level by employers’ asso-
ciations and the most representative trade unions at national level, and company-level 
contracts concluded by company-level or unitary trade union representatives, access-
to-work contracts are regulated, wherever compatible, by the provisions of Legislative 
Decree no. 368, 6 September 200118
The access-to-work contract is required to be in writing, specifying the individual em-
ployment plan. In the absence of a written agreement the contract is null and void, and 
the worker is deemed to be hired on an open-ended employment contract. 
. 
The duration of the contract may be not less than nine not more than 18 months. In the 
case of individuals with a serious physical disability, learning disability or psychiatric 
disorder, as defined by legal provisions, the contract may be extended for a maximum 
of 13 months. Access-to-work contracts may not be renewed between the same parties. 
Extensions to the contract are allowed up to the maximum duration. In calculating the 
maximum duration of the contract, no account is taken of periods covered by military 
or civilian service, or for maternity leave. Percentage limits on the use of this type of 
contract may be laid down by collective agreements. 
 
 
5. Economic and normative incentives 
 
Both apprenticeship contracts and access-to-work contracts attract a series of economic 
and normative incentives. 
In this connection, in the absence of different provisions laid down by legislation or 
collective bargaining, no account is taken of workers hired on apprenticeship or access-
to-work contracts in the calculation of the limits laid down by law or by collective 
agreements for the application of specific norms and practices. Moreover, it is permit-
                                            
18 See the documentation and bibliography at www.adapt.it, index A-Z, under Contratto a termine. 
ted to hire a worker in an employment grade two levels below the grade applicable, 
under the terms of the national collective agreement, to workers carrying out tasks re-
quiring qualifications corresponding to the qualification to be gained at upon comple-
tion of the apprenticeship or the access-to-work contract. 
However, it is intended to change the economic incentives for these two types of con-
tract. Pending the systematic reform of employment incentives, the economic incen-
tives currently in place are to remain unchanged only for apprenticeship contracts. In 
the case of access-to-work contracts, on the other hand, the existing economic incen-
tives for employment training contracts will be granted only for workers in the disad-
vantaged categories. 
The Biagi reform extends the range of flexible types of contract, so it was considered to 
be reasonable to concentrate economic incentives on the one hand on access/return-to-
work contracts for disadvantaged workers, and, on the other hand, on apprenticeship 
contracts, considering that they fully comply with the requirement to provide effective 
training. 
The financial incentives for the old employment training contracts have therefore been 
concentrated on a more limited range of individuals: formerly these incentives were 
granted to all those between the ages of 15 and 32, and even to older groups on the ba-
sis of regional provisions. The plan to focus financial incentives more sharply is in-
tended to support workers who are far less attractive to employers than those who cur-
rently benefit from employment training contracts. 
The savings on access-to-work contracts (replacing the old employment training con-
tracts) will be used to compensate the higher costs, when the scheme is fully opera-
tional, of the incentives for apprenticeship contracts arising from the increase of the 
number of possible beneficiaries (by raising the age limit from 24 to 29 years of age). 
This increase in costs should be more than offset by the savings achieved, more gener-
ally, by the provisions introduced by the decree that are intended to reduce the area of 
employment in the grey or black market, benefiting not just the workers concerned (in 
the form of a higher level of protection) but also the public finances (in the form of 
higher revenues). 
In line with the overall aim of redesigning training contracts in order to make the train-
ing component effective, the legislator has made provision for sanctions in cases in 
which the training objectives are not complied with. In particular, in the case of a seri-
ous failure to implement the individual access-to-work plan, the employer is obliged to 
repay the training grant with a 100 per cent surcharge. For apprenticeship contracts, in 
cases in which no training is provided and the training requirements of the contract are 
not met, an employer who is solely responsible for non-compliance with the terms laid 
down in the contract is obliged to repay the training grant with a 100 per cent sur-
charge. 
 
 
6. Conclusions: the impact of the inadequate functioning of the industrial relations 
system on the implementation of training contracts 
 
The reform of training contracts was undoubtedly necessary, and there have been re-
peated calls for such a reform by legal scholars and even by the legislator. Even the 
 Treu reform of 199719
However, the reform is making little progress due to the inadequate functioning of the 
industrial relations system. As a result, the objective that has repeatedly been empha-
sised of boosting investment in human capital, in support of enterprise and labour 
productivity, is still far from being reached. 
 contained proposals for a reform of the kind later implemented 
by the Biagi Act. 
In implementing the Biagi reform, the social partners have simply activated a transition 
from employment training contracts to access-to-work contracts20, without responding 
to the need to provide norms for apprenticeship contracts. The lack of a collaborative 
atmosphere between the government and the social partners, both at national and re-
gional level, has led to a paralysis of the reform, resulting once again in an improper 
use of apprenticeship contracts that increasingly resemble the old employment training 
contracts rather than the new forms of labour market access with an alternation be-
tween education/training and employment21
                                            
19 Article 16 (15), Act no. 196, 1997. 
. This is a demonstration of the fact that 
legislative reforms by themselves cannot achieve a great deal in the absence of an in-
dustrial relations system willing to implement them fully and coherently. 
20 Based on two interconfederal agreements, one on employment training contracts in November 2003, 
and one on work access contracts in February 2004. See also www.adapt.it, index A-Z. 
21 For updated information on the implementation of the reform of employment contracts, see 
www.adapt.it, index A-Z, under Apprendistato. 
